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Examiner Criticism of Loans
An important purpose of our sample survey of the bank examination
records of the Federal Reserve banks of New York, Philadelphia, and
Atlanta was to secure data on the risks involved in bank lending to
small business. The results most relevant to that particular issue are
included in a fàrthcoming National Bureau report, "Risks and Returns
in Small-Business Financing," by Geoffrey H. Moore, Thomas R. Atkin-
son, and Edward J. Kilberg. This report, which was commissioned by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as part of the
study of small business financing requested by the United States Con-
gress in 1957, was published in preliminary form (not yet including
the bank examination survey results), together with other parts of the
Federal Reserve study, as a Committee Print of the 85th Congress.'
In compiling the bank examination data, a great deal of information
was also obtained that was relevant not merely to bank lending to small
business but to lending risks, experience, and standards for business
loans in general. It is some of these broader findings that are reported
here.
The National Bureau survey covered a sample of sixty state mem-
ber banks, consisting of twenty banks in each of the New York, Phila-
delphia, and Atlanta Federal Reserve Districts. The sample includes a
broad cross section of banks, ranging from small rural institutions to
New York City giants. It cannot, however, be taken to represent the
universe of all state member banks in these areas, mainly because banks
with deposits of less than $25millionare substantially underrepresented.
i.FinancingSmall Bu.siness: Report to the Committees on Banking and Currency
and the Select Committees on Small Business by the Federal Reserve System, Parts
1and 2, 85thCongress,2nd Session, Washington, 1958.
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Attention was concentrated on the detailed records of the annual
examinations of loan portfolios for 1957 (the latest year for which data
were available at the time of the survey), but summary records for
the preceding years back to 1947 were also tabulated. Because of the
massive nature of the detailed records, which included data for thous-
ands of individual borrowers and loans, additional sampling procedures
had to be employed. These and other technical matters relating to
sampling and tabulating procedures may be found in the Appendix.
The Examination Process
Each Federal Reserve bank is responsible for the examination of the
state-.chartered member banks in its district. (National banks are ex-
amined by the Comptroller of the Currency; state nonmember insured
banks by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.) Every state
member bank is visited by the examiners once a year without prior
notice. The examiners ascertain the solvency of the bank—that proper
provision has been made for bad debts, that capital is unimpaired, that
the condition of the bank is properly shown on the books and statements.
They satisfy themselves that the business is conducted according to law.
They investigate the character and competence of the bank management
and require the correction of unsafe and unsound tendencies and
policies.
A major part of the examination procedure is a close inspection of
each bank's loan and investment portfolio. The individual credit files
are scrutinized for all loans that exceed a usually quite low "cut-off"
point selected primarily on the basis of the bank's size.2 In this process,
the principal information in each file, including balance-sheet sum-
maries where available, is copied by the examiners and becomes part
of the confidential record of the examination. Moreover, these "loan
cards" contain space for several years of data and are updated at each
examination (provided, of course, that the loan is still on the books),
2No records were available giving the actual cut-offs used for particular banks.
The cut-offs are designed so that a preponderance of the total dollar volume of
loans outstanding will be individually examined. Except for very large banks with
deposits over $100 million, they appeared to be generally on the order of $4,000 or
less for unsecured loans, and somewhat higher for secured loans. For the giant
banks, they ranged apparently as high as a quarter of a million dollars or there-
abouts.
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so that a card may contain a historical record of a particular loan or
borrower going back as far as five years.
Whenever an examiner concludes that a given loan involves undue
risk, he "classifies" (that is, criticizes) it as either "substandard," "doubt-
ful," or "loss." Examiners are instructed to criticize loans under the
following circumstances: A loan or portion thereof is to be rated "loss,"
and promptly charged off, should the examiner conclude that it is
"uncollectible." A loan or part thereof is rated "doubtful" if "a sub-
stantial loss is probable but not definitely ascertainable in amount." A
loan is rated "substandard" if it "involves more than a normal risk due
to the financial condition or unfavorable record of the obligor, insuf-
ficiency of security, or other factors noted in the examiner's comments.
These assets should be given and corrective attention, for ex-
ample, by obtaining suitable reductions in amount, additional security,
more complete financial data concerning obligor's condition, or other
action as specific circumstances may require."3
The incidence of examiner criticism in the period since World War
II has been low but not insignificant. For 1939-51 aggregate data for
total loans (business and otherwise) rated substandard by examiners
were published by the FDIC for all insured commercial banks. As
shown in Table 1, the percentage of the total dollar volume of all loans
that was rated substandard declined sharply between 1939 and 1945,
and ranged between roughly 0.75 and 1.25 per cent for the remainder
of the period.4
Time series for criticized loans, similar to the FDIC series, were
compiled for the banks in the Bank Examination Survey for 1947-57
(Table 1). The incidence of substandard loans for 1947-51, the years
for which the two series overlap, isfairly similar. The direction of
change in the incidence of criticism is the same for every year, but the
amplitude of the fluctuations in the survey data is greater. For 1952-57,
3Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt (commonly referred
to as the Patman Hearings), 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, Washington, 1952, Reply by the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, p. 614. The above definitions have been
in force since July 15, 1949, for all the federal bank supervisory agencies.
41934-40, data were published only for insured nonmember banks, which
constitute a relatively small part of the banking universe in terms of dollar totals
for deposits and loans. These figures show a steady and sharp decline for the entire
period covered.
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TABLE
INCIDENCEOF CRITICIZED LOANS, 1939-57
















1947 1,28 1.27 1.42
1948 1.35 1.87 2.12
1949 1.26 1.63 1.95
1950 0.99 1.04 1.33
1951 0.73 0.55 0.79
1952 0.73 1.00
1953 0.98 1.23 1.70
1954 . '0.87 1.14 1.72
1955 1.06 1.26 2.30
1956 0.90 1.18 2.10
1957 0.78 0.95 1.74
available.
a Total substandard loans as a percentage of "appraised value," which is equal
to book value less examiners' deductions (total value of loans classified "loss,"
half of value of loans classified "doubtful"). Book value of total and substandard
loans is net of valuation reserves. As a result, data from 1947 on, when valuation
reserves began to rise rapidly because of a change in tax treatment, are not fully
comparable with earlier data. Taken from annual reports of the FDIC.
bFor 1947-51, these banks held 8 per cent of the criticized loans of all insured
commercial banks. (No later data for aggregate criticized loans are available.)
Losses for these banks during 1948-51 (1947 aggregate data not available) were
7 per cent of the national total for insured commercial banks.
CTotalbusiness loans were obtained from the call reports closest to the
examination dates in each year. For 1957, the loan volume at the examination dates
was also estimated by sampling directly the examiners' reports on individual loans;
the difference between the two results was only $46 million out of an aggregate
volume of about $3.25 billion.
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the survey data place the incidence of substandard loans at around 0.75
to 1 per cent of total loans.
The bank examination data were also used to develop estimates for
criticized business loans for 1953-57; no prior statistics on this subject
are available. The criticism rates for business loans for these years
ranged from $1.70 per $100 of loans in 1953 to $2.30 in 1955. While
these rates axe uniformly higher than those based on total loans, this
is largely due to technical factors. Thus, consumer loans, which for
many banks add up to an important part of the total loan portfolio, are
generally small in size and not subject to individual evaluation by the
examiners, while security loans, also important in many banks, are not
apt to draw criticism unless there has been a departure from the
standard types of collateral or loan agreements. In fact, our data indicate
that 95 per cent or more of all criticized loans are business loans.
In the three districts covered by the study, the bulk of criticized
loans—approximately 80 per cent, both in terms of numbers of loans
and loan amounts—is classified substandard; of the remaining 20 per
cent, more than half is classified loss. The percentage of total loan
volume, classified doubtful or loss is thus very small.
These statistics are presented at this stage to provide some per-
spective on the magnitudes under discussion; they will be analyzed
more fully in Chapter 4.
Meaning of Examiner Gritici8ln
The formal definitions of the terms "substandard," "doubtful," and "loss"
do not provide much guidance to the specific factors that examiners
actually take into account when appraising a loan. Indeed, there is no
standard list of "check points" or rules of thumb for examiners. The
basic considerations, however, have been stated in published remarks
by examination officers and have been confirmed in discussions with
examiners.
A vice-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has
submitted the following (among others) as features of credit files that
may put an examiner on guard: poor financial ratios; receivables that
include bad accounts; excessive advertising and investment in unprofit-
able subsidiaries; excessive loans to officers, etc.; excessive expenses;
falling sales or continual operating losses; excessive withdrawals or
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dividends; and uninsured losses.5 The character of the above list of
weaknesses and the fact that loans are evaluated individually suggest
that loan classification is primarily an appraisal of the borrowers.
Some statistical evidence of this is provided by comparing balance-
sheet ratios of borrowers with criticized loans with these ratios for
borrowers with noncriticized loans. Virtually all authorities include
financial ratios among the principal guides on which approval or re-
jection of individual loan applications should be based.6 Indeed, the
National Association of B.ank Loan Officers and Credit Men (more
generally known as the Robert Morris Associates) solicits from its
members every year the balance sheets of representative borrowers,
and combines these into composite balance sheets expressed in ratio
form.7 These averages are furnished to the Associates for use as yard-
sticks to appraise the soundness of loans on the books or of new
applicants.8
5Paul C. Stetzelberger, "An Examiner Considers a Loan Account," Btilletin of
the Robert Morris Associates, May 1954, p. 302.
GSee, for example, Roger F. Murray, "Evaluating Creditworthiness," and N. H.
Moyses, "The Financing of Intermediates," in Benjamin Haggot Beckhart (ed.),
Loans of American Commercial Banks, New York, 1959, pp. 77 and 183;
Roland I. Robinson, The Management of Bank Funds, New York, 1951, P. 138;
Neil H. Jacoby and.J. Fred Weston, "Factors Influencing Managerial Decisions in
Determining Forms of Business Financing: An Exploratory Study," in Conference on
Research in Business Finance, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research,
1952, p. 171; Edward F. Gee, "Simplified Credit Analysis for Smaller Banks,"
Bulletin of the Robert Morris Associates, May 1947, p. 411, for a banker's point of
view; and Stetzelberger in Bulletin of the Robert Morris Associates,May 1954,
p. 297, for an examiner's point of view.
7 Morris Associates, What It Is and What It Does, Camden, 1953, p. 7.
is also statistical evidenäe that financial ratios are effective indicators
of risk. For business borrowers, Charles Merwin (Financing Small Corporations in
Five Manufacturing Industries, 1926-36, New York, NBER, 1942, p. 99) found
that firms that eventually discontinued business in 1932-36 generally had below-
average financial ratios as much as six years earlier. As early as 1926, firms that
were eventually to discontinue business during 1932-36 had lower-than-average
financial ratios; moreover, the differential in ratios between such firms and surviving
firms widened during the intervening years. The study is summarized briefly in the
report of Moore, Atkinson, and Kilberg (in Financing Small Business, p. 64).
In their examination of Reconstruction Finance Corporation lending experi-
ence, Raymond J. Saulnier, Harold C. Haicrow, and Neil I-I. Jacoby (Federal Lend-
ing and Loan Insurance, Princeton for NBER, 1958, P. 458) found the incidence
of defaults and losses to be higher among borrowers with poor financial ratios at
the time of their loan application. (The RFC data are also summarized in the report
of Moore, Atkinson, and Kilberg in Financing Small Business, Pp. 63-65.)
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Three ratios were calculated for all borrowers for which balance-
sheet data were recorded on the examiners' loan cards: the current
ratio, the working-capital ratio, and the worth-debt ratio. The current
ratio is defined as current assets divided by current liabilities; the work-
ing-capital ratio as current assets minus current liabilities, expressed as
a proportion of total assets; and the worth-debt ratio as net worth
divided by totalliabilities. For each of these, the higher the ratio (other
things equal), the stronger is the firm's financial condition.9 In Table 2,
the average ratios for various groups of borrowers, cross-classified by
industry and size, are compared for loans that were and loans that were
not criticized. As the table shows, borrowers whose loans were criticized
had lower current ratios, on the average, than other borrowers in nine-
teen out of twenty-one cells for which such a comparison is possible;
they had lower working-capital ratios in twenty out of twenty-one cases;
and they had lower worth-debt ratios in twelve out of nineteen cases.
Two of the seven instances in which criticized borrowers had higher
worth-debt ratios occurred in the finance industry, in which these ratios
are typically low. In that industry, a principal test of good management
is the extent of "leverage" obtained on the invested capital; an unusually
high worth-debt ratio thus would be regarded as an indication that, for
one reason or another, the firm was not making efficient use of its
capital.1°
The results confirm that examiners give heavy weight to the con-
dition of individual borrowers in their loan evaluations. Nevertheless,
factors other than borrower "quality" must enter into examiner ap-
praisals at least occasionally, since the ultimate objective of the
amination process is the soundness of the bank as a whole. Loans are
appraised also in the light of the bank's capital position, the composition
of its assets, and the nature and variability of its deposit liabilities.
9the reasons for choosing these ratios and certain technical factors in their
interpretation, see my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "Changes in the Quality of
Business Loans of Commercial Banks," Columbia University, December 1960,
appendix to Chapter V. In particular, it is shown that financial ratios are not com-
parable for borrowers of different industries or sizes. See also Financing Small
Business, p. 55.
lOSee Moyses and Drake, in Beckhart, Business Loans, pp. 178 and 152
(footnote). The different significance of worth-debt ratios for finance companies
from that for most other businesses provides just one example of the importance of
disaggregating industries when analyzing financial ratios, If the worth-debt ratio
analysis had been limited to the "all industries" entry in the table, the comparison
would have had to be regarded as inconclusive, precisely because that aggregate is
substantially influenced by the results for finance companies.
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TABLE2
AVERAGEFINANCIAL RATIOS OF BORROWERS, FOR CRITICIZED AND
UNCRITICIZED LOANS, BY INDUSTRY AND SIZE OF 1957a
Size of







U C .U C
Durable L 2.581.84 .277 .2530.54 0.65
goods manu- M 2.401.75 .307 .1730.54 0.41
facturing. S 2.071.41 .294 .1460.45 0.33
Nondurable L 3.031.44 .338 .1440.50 0.48
goods manu- M 2.191.86 .312 .2550.45 0.31
facturing S 2.041.32 .306 .0620.41 0.41
Retail L 2.541.61 .346 .1390.82 0.52
trade M 2.211.67 .280 .1780.63 0.40
S 2.082.46 .262 .1810.56 1.11
Services L 1.700.10 .125—.1460.40 0.31
M 1.650.89 .108—.0300.65 0.52
S 1.771.05—.009—.4391.53 1.83
Construction L 1.431.60 .143 .1980.34 0.13
M 1.601.07 .054 .0190.51 0.42
S 1.48 b .204 b 0.74 b
Wholesale L 1.981.54 .820 .2550.61 0.41
trade M 1.831.09 .331 .0460.39 0.78
S 2.11 1.72 .331 .2200.61 0.52
Financec L 1.661.26 .100—.0280.22d b,d
M 1.480.80 .037—.0140.18d 2.12d
S 1.751.19 .241 .0730.20d 0.26d
L 1.06 b .001 b n.a. n.a.
Utilities M 1.070.48—.090—.240n.a. n.a.
S b 0.16 b —.581n.a. n.a.
All indus- L 2.081.46 .215 .0890.48 0.51
tries M 1.921.38 .208 .0980.51 0.44
S 2.081.48 .292 .1160.46 0.44
All sizes 1.981.42 .239 .0960.48 0.45
NOTE: Llarge, M =medium,S =small,U =uncriticized,C = criticized.
For definitions of industry and size classifications, see Appendix. Ratios are simple
averages of ratios for individual borrowers. The ratios for all borrowers (criticized
and uncriticized) taken together are almost identical with those for uncriticized
borrowers.
SouRcE: Bank Examination Survey.
a When 1957 data were not available, 1956 data were used.
b No data in this cell.
c Includes sales finance companies, real estate firms, and commodity dealers.
d Sales finance companies only.
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"Individual loans may be sound, but risk inherent in large lines, con-
centrations of credit to the same or related interests, industry, or
collateral, must be considered." "In all instances, the objective is to
appraise the nature and degree of risk in the assets ...andrelate the
total exposure to the capital account, earning power, and managerial
capacity."12 It is possible, therefore, that a loan regarded as sound for
one bank might be considered unsound for another, depending on such
factors as the size of the loan in relation to the bank's capital and the
amount of similar loans the bank might have on its books. However,
instances in which loans are criticized for such reasons are probably
relatively few. Moreover, by the same type of reasoning, some loans
in which the risk of nonpayment appeared high might not be criticized
because the collateral or endorsement provided the lending bank with
virtually ironclad protection against ultimate loss.
A further reason for examiner criticism that may not be related to
the "quality" of the borrower is lack of adequate information about
the loan in the bank's credit files. Such loans are often "specially
mentioned" rather than actually criticized, but there are probably also
cases in which they incur outright criticism. Although such loans may
in fact be more prone to default than the average, the incidence of
criticism may still be somewhat higher than default experience alone
would warrant. All in all, however, even though no quantitative meas-
urement is possible, it is probably fair to state that the focus in loan
evaluation is predominantly on the soundness of the borrower.
Of course, a b.ank might possibly be compensated for the undue
risk in a criticized loan by a particularly high interest rate. Indeed, if
not for other influences at work, the level of rates and the size of rate
differentials might perhaps be regarded as indexes of loan quality. In
actuality, however, the adjustment of interest charges to changes in
risk conditions, whether cyclical or longer-run, takes place very slug-
gishly. Moreover, as a general rule, an examiner's appraisal of the
quality of a loan is not influenced by the interest rate. Thus, examiner
criticism rates provide a useful independent measure of fluctuations
in the soundness of the banking system and, as the other side of the
coin, in the degree of strain on the business financial structure.
11 Manual of Instructions for the Preparation of Reports of Examination, Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Examination Department, April 1951, Appendix.
i2Patman Hearings, reply by Alfred H. Williams, president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, p. 829.
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Do examiners really succeed in picking out the risky loans? Is the
incidence of default or loss, especially during a business recession,
actually higher on loans that were previously criticized than on un-
criticized loans? It had been hoped to check these points directly from
the examiners' reports, but the project was not feasible within the
resources available to this study. Furthermore, .there are basic difficul-
ties involved which arise because banks are expected to take remedial
action of one sort or another when a particular loan iscriticized.
Ordinarily, the examiner is able to obtain "the agreement of the bank's
management as to the appropriateness of the classification."13 The out-
come presumably is that the loan may be collected or recast on some
sounder footing (for example, additional collateral may be secured),
and potential default forestalled. Furthermore, even when no such
action is taken, the efficiency of the examiners cannot be evaluated
merely from the frequency of defaults or losses among criticized loans;
allowance must be made for the differences in timing and cyclical
influences to which loans made to different borrowers at different times
and places are subject.
To be conclusive, therefore, a test of examiner efficiency would
have to rely on a case study. Loans incurring criticism would have to
be traced until their termination, with or without default or loss; loans
eventuating in default or loss would have to be traced back to determine
whether they had previously been criticized. As already indicated,
resources were not available to undertake this task.
It was possible, however, to test the relation of the incidence of
examiner criticism to the incidence of losses on loans on a bank-by-bank
basis (as opposed to the loan-by-loan case-study method). This test
yielded significantly positive results.
Fifty-six of the banks in the survey were ranked according to the
incidence of substandard loans in their portfolios during 1947-57, and
this ranking was compared with a similar ranking based on actual gross
charge-offs.'4 The entire period 1947-57 was used, first,, to take in as
l3Patman Hearings, reply by President Allan Sproul, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, p. 828.
14 Loans classified "doubtful" or "loss" were excluded from the criticism rate
because many of them might be cases in which criticism reflected the fact that
default had already occurred, without any prior warning from the examiners. These
clearly are not instances that should be scored as "successes" for the examiners.
Four banks were omitted because of total or substantial absence of the required data.
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many losses as possible (since losses were quite rare), and, second, to
maximize the probability that all the banks would have experienced
substantial cyclical swings in local business conditions. Such a test is
not "fair" to the examiners for several reasons. The banks are not
necessarily uniform in their cyclical experience: some regional differ-
entials in cyclical fortunes may well have prevailed for the period
viewed as a whole. Still further, we have data only for losses actually
charged off and not for temporary defaults or "delinquencies" which
presumably occur much more frequently and would therefore provide
a statistically more reliable measure of lending experience. Finally,
there is the fact that criticized loans consist primarily of business loans,
while the loss data are available only for total loans.
The correlations actually found were low, but significant at the
1 per cent level by a wide margin. When the criticism rate for each
bank was expressed as the ratio of substandard loans to total loans, the
(Kendall) coefficient of correlation was 0.23; when it was expressed
as the ratio of substandard loans to business rather than all loans, the
TABLE3
FREQUENCYDISTRIBUTION OF BANKS RANKED ACCORDING TO
EXAMINER CRITIcIsM RATE AND LOAN Loss RATE FOR 1947-57
(numberof banks)
Ranked According
to Loss Rate •
RankedAccording to Criticism Rate
LowestThird MiddleThirdHighestThird
Lowest third 10 6 2
Middle third 3 8 8
Highest third 5 5 9
Average criticism rate(per cent) 0.12 0.69 2.24
Average loss rate (percent) 0.12 0.12 0.21
NOTE: Lowest third corresponds to ranks 1-18, middle to 19-37, highest to
38-56. All rates are based on total (rather than business) loans. Criticism rate refers
to substandard loans only, and excludes loans classified "doubtful" or "loss."
Bank Examination Survey.
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coefficient• was 0.22.15 The extent of correlation may be judged from
Table 8, which divides the banks into nine groups, each corresponding
to a high, middle, or low criticism rate and loss rate, respectively. If
the correlation were perfect, all banks would be found on the principal
diagonal. When the same table was constructed on a quartile basis,
little of the relationship remained visible.
This concludes our introductory survey of the bank examination
data. The more detailed findings presented in the ensuing chapters, it
is believed, confirm the initial impression that here is a consistent and
meaningful set of data of potentially great value for the analysis of
financial practices business fluctuations.
15 andall subsequent rank correlations employed in thestudywere
obtained by methods described in Maurice C. Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods,
New York, 1955, Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 6.
16